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HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING IN THE 
VETERANS HEALTH ADMINISTRATION: THE 
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR INFORMED CONSENT 
AND ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
Liliana Kalogjera Barry* 
I. INTRODUCTION
Voluminous literature exists in both the medical and legal 
communities on health care decision making, whether it be in 
regard to advance directives or end of life decisions.1  There is 
also a growing body of research and commentary assessing 
various facets of health care decision making in the Veterans 
Health Administration (VHA) of the United States Department 
of Veterans Affairs (VA).2  There is, however, a relative dearth of 
     * Liliana Kalogjera Barry is a Staff Attorney at the US. Department of 
Veterans Affairs Office of Regional Counsel in Milwaukee and 
Assistant Clinical Professor in the Department of Psychiatry and 
Behavioral Medicine at the Medical College of Wisconsin.  She 
completed her undergraduate degree in both bioethics and public 
policy at Brown University, law degree at Columbia University, and 
post-graduate fellowship at the University of Chicago’s MacLean 
Center for Clinical Medical Ethics. 
The content is the responsibility of the author alone and does not 
necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Department of Health 
and Human Services or the Department of Veterans Affairs, nor does 
mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply 
endorsement by the U.S. government. 
 1.  See, e.g., examples cited herein, including Thaddeus Mason Pope, The
Maladaptation of Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the 
Patient Self-Determination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 156 (1999) (discussing 
existence of over a hundred publications pertaining to the Patient Self-
Determination Act). 
 2.  See, e.g., Kenneth A. Berkowitz, End-Of-Life Decisionmaking in the Veterans 
Health Administration, 9 HEC FORUM 169 (1997); Ruth-Ann Phelps, VHA Policy-
Related Clinical Ethical Issues, 9 HEC FORUM 159 (1997); and Ladislav Volicer et al., 
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literature, particularly legal literature, examining the legal 
significance of the fact that a patient makes health care decisions 
within the VA as opposed to alternative care settings that are 
subject to state law, e.g., private health care facilities.  This article 
provides a background of the VA, an overview of relevant law 
pertaining to health care decision making, and a discussion of 
significant ways that health care decision making may differ 
between VA and non-VA facilities, focusing on Wisconsin law as 
an example.3
II. BACKGROUND ON THE VHA 
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs is a federal executive 
department4 tasked with the mission described by Abraham 
Lincoln “[t]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and 
for his widow, and his orphan.”5  Stated statutorily, the VA’s 
purpose is “to administer the laws providing benefits and other 
services to veterans and the dependents and the beneficiaries of 
veterans.”6  Although Congress formally established the 
Veterans Administration in 1930, its roots date back to a 1636 
Pilgrim law that provided for colony support of disabled 
soldiers.7  The VA “became a cabinet-level department in 1989” 
and provides a variety of benefits, including “pension, 
education, disability compensation, home loans, life insurance, 
vocational rehabilitation, survivor support, medical care, and 
burial benefits.”8  The VA touches many Americans because of 
Advance Care Planning by Proxy for Residents of Long-Term Care Facilities Who Lack 
Decision-Making Capacity, 50 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 761 (2002). 
 3.  For purposes of this article, “non-VHA facilities” refers to non-VHA 
facilities outside of the federal government (e.g., excluding U.S. Department of 
Defense facilities).  
 4.  38 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012). 
 5.  About VA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/landing 
2_about.htm (last updated Feb. 17, 2012). 
 6.  38 U.S.C. § 301(b) (2012). 
 7.  History – VA History, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/ 
about_va/vahistory.asp (last updated Apr. 5, 2012). 
 8.  The Executive Branch, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-
government/executive-branch (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
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its size; “About a quarter of the nation’s population — 
approximately 70 million people — are potentially eligible for 
V.A. benefits and services because they are veterans, family 
members, or survivors of veterans.”9  In addition to other offices 
and agencies, the VA consists of three administrations: the 
National Cemetery Administration, the Veterans Benefits 
Administration, and the Veterans Health Administration.10
VHA, which serves over 8.3 million veterans annually, is 
the nation’s largest integrated health care system, consisting of 
152 medical centers, approximately 1,400 community-based 
outpatient clinics, community living centers, Vet Centers, and 
Domiciliaries.11  VHA employs more than 53,000 health care 
providers,12 who provide care across the fifty states and in 
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and the 
Virgin Islands.13
III. OVERVIEW OF LAW PERTAINING TO HEALTH CARE DECISION 
MAKING
A basic primer on autonomy and informed consent, advance 
directives and the Patient Self Determination Act, and mental 
health advance directives helps provide the context for this 
article’s discussion of differences between VA and non-VA 
facilities. 
A. AUTONOMY AND INFORMED CONSENT
The concept of autonomy is the focal point for law and 
ethics pertaining to health care decision making.14  Autonomy 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  38 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012). 
 11.  About VHA, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., http://www.va.gov/health/ 
aboutVHA.asp (last updated Oct. 5, 2011). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Browse Veterans Health Administration Facilities by State, U.S. DEP’T
VETERANS AFF., http://www2.va.gov/directory/guide/Allstate_flsh.asp?dnum=1 
(last updated July 23, 2010). 
 14.  See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed 
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means “personal self-governance” in the moral philosophy 
context and represents “freedom from external constraint and 
the presence of critical mental capacities such as understanding, 
intending, and voluntary decision-making capacity.”15
Autonomy has legal roots in the United States Constitution.  
These roots include both the federally recognized right of 
privacy grounded in the Constitution and the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,16 which prohibits a state 
from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”17
The Supreme Court articulated an individual’s right “to the 
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint 
or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law” over a century ago.18  In the health care arena, 
this right dictates that “[e]very human being of adult years and 
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his 
own body . . . ,”19 which includes the right to refuse medical 
treatment.20  The right to refuse treatment stems from the 
common law doctrine that touching another without consent or 
justification constitutes battery.21  This right to make one’s own 
treatment decisions does not end when an individual becomes 
incapacitated.22
The doctrine of informed consent is an extension of the right 
to refuse unwanted treatment that is both established in 
Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 434–35 
(2006). 
 15.  TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN 
BIOETHICS 22 (6th ed. 2003). 
 16.  Carol J. Wessels, Treated with Respect: Enforcing Patient Autonomy by 
Defending Advance Directives, 6 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 217, 219–20 (2005). 
 17.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 18.  Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (citing Union 
Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
19. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
20.  Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. 
 21.  Id. at 269. 
 22.  Id. at 262 (holding that, while an incompetent individual may refuse 
treatment, the state may require clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent’s 
wishes for such refusal). 
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common law23 and codified in state statutes and/or  
regulations.24  It has evolved from a relatively simple battery-
based doctrine (i.e., one focused on unwanted touching) to a 
more nuanced, negligence-based doctrine (i.e., one focused on 
the affirmative obligations of a health care provider).25  Under 
the doctrine of informed consent, a health care provider has the 
duty to obtain a patient’s informed, voluntary consent for 
treatment, absent an applicable exception.  Courts are split on 
the standard for informed consent, with about half of all states 
imposing a physician-based standard (i.e., requiring disclosure 
based on the perspective of what a “reasonably prudent 
practitioner” would discuss with a patient),26 and the other half 
imposing a “reasonable patient” standard (i.e., requiring 
disclosure based on the perspective of what a reasonable patient 
would want to know from a provider).27  Wisconsin, which 
imposes a reasonable patient standard, is one example of a state 
that, in addition to common law requirements,28 has imposed 
statutory informed consent requirements to require a treating 
physician to “inform the patient about the availability of all 
alternate, viable medical modes of treatment and about the 
benefits and risks of these treatments.”29
B. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PSDA 
Advance directives are legal tools for extending patient 
autonomy in the event of decisional incapacity, 30 i.e., in the 
event the patient lacks decision making capacity.  Through an 
advance directive, an individual expresses his/her preferences 
 23.  See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 24.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012). 
 25.  BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 347 (4th ed. 2001). 
 26.  King & Moulton, supra note 14, at 430. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 315 (Wis. 1973). 
 29.  WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012). 
 30.  Holly Fernandez Lynch et al., Compliance with Advance Directives: Wrongful 
Living and Tort Law Incentives, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 134 (2008). 
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regarding health care, and the advance directive is used to guide 
treatment decisions when the individual is unable to make or 
express such decisions.31  Advance directives include the living 
will and the durable power of attorney for health care.  A living 
will or other “instruction directive” is “an advance directive in 
which a person establishes a list of guidelines for his or her 
future care, but does not appoint someone to carry out those 
instructions.”32  Examples of such guidelines include expressions 
of the individual’s preferences with regard to tube-feeding and 
mechanical ventilation.  A durable power of attorney or “proxy 
directive” “is an advance directive in which . . . a person is 
appointed to carry out the desired instructions or make 
decisions regarding the health care of the person executing the 
document.”33  The person named as proxy under a health care 
power of attorney is also known as a “surrogate decision-
maker,”34 “health care proxy or agent.”35  The agent has the duty 
to make decisions “consistent with the patient’s previously 
expressed choices or best interests.”36
Today all states have laws in place that recognize some 
form of advance directive.37  However, that was not always the 
case.  States began legal recognition of advance directives 
toward the end of the 1970s, but use of advance directives was 
relatively rare for their first decade of availability.38
The Patient Self-Determination Act39 (PSDA) represented 
 31.  Wessels, supra note 16, at 218. 
 32.  Werner Gruber, Life and Death on Your Terms: The Advance Directives 
Dilemma and What Should be Done in the Wake of the Schiavo Case, 15 ELDER L. J. 503, 
504–05 (2007). 
 33.  Id. at 505. 
 34.  Pope, supra note 1, at 152. 
 35.  BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL DILEMMAS 90 (4th ed. 2009).
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Pope, supra note 1, at 147. 
 39.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc 
(1990)).   
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Congress’s attempt to increase the use of advance directives.40
The PSDA imposes various obligations pertaining to advance 
directives on health care entities that receive Medicare or 
Medicaid funds,41 and VA policy states that it “provides the 
model and context for VA policy on advance care planning.”42
These requirements include maintenance of written policies and 
procedures regarding adult individuals receiving treatment 
from the entity as follows: 
(A) to provide written information to each such 
individual concerning – 
 (i) an individual’s rights under State law (whether 
statutory or as recognized by the courts of the State) to 
make decisions concerning such medical care, 
including the right to accept or refuse medical or 
surgical treatment and the right to formulate advance 
directives . . . and 
 (ii) the written policies of the provider or 
organization respecting the implementation of such 
rights; 
(B) to document in a prominent part of the individual’s 
current medical record whether or not the individual 
has executed an advance directive; 
(C) not to condition the provision of care or otherwise 
discriminate against an individual based on whether or 
not the individual has executed an advance directive; 
(D) to ensure compliance with requirements of State 
law (whether statutory or as recognized by the courts 
of the State) respecting advance directives at facilities of 
the provider or organization; and 
(E) to provide (individually or with others) for 
education for staff and the community on issues 
concerning advance directives.43
 40.  Maria J. Silveira et al., Advance Directives and Outcomes of Surrogate Decision 
Making Before Death, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1211, 1212 (Apr. 2010). 
 41.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 
1388 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc 
(1990)).   
 42.  Advance Care Planning and Management of Advance Directives, VHA
HANDBOOK 1004.02 (Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), July 2, 2009, at 1 
[hereinafter VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02]. 
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f) (2012). 
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The PSDA defines “advance directive” as “a written 
instruction, such as a living will or durable power of attorney for 
health care, recognized under State law (whether statutory or as 
recognized by the courts of the State) and relating to the 
provision of such care when the individual is incapacitated.”44
Although the PSDA does not create substantive rights with 
regard to advance directives, it sets forth procedures that 
“bolster” relevant state laws.45
In addition to the PSDA, the Uniform Health-Care 
Decisions Act of 1993 represents an attempt to promote advance 
directives through the law.46  However, only seven states have 
incorporated this model into law, and they have done so with 
added restrictions (e.g., witness requirements).47
Despite attempts to increase the creation and use of advance 
directives, weaknesses or limitations of advance directives 
remain.  Overall completion rates remain low, in the range of 18 
to 36 percent for adults.48  In addition, there are practical 
problems inherent in the creation of advance directives, and 
these problems can affect the overall quality of the resulting 
document.  For example, due to the information asymmetry 
between health care providers and patients, patients may have 
erroneous understandings of the nature of various life-
sustaining treatments, which could adversely affect their ability 
to express their preferences with regard to such treatments.49
Once an advance directive exists, legal barriers may impede the 
implementation of an advance directive (e.g., state laws 
restricting a health care agent’s ability to act according to the 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Robert S. Olick, Defining Features of Advance Directives in Law and Clinical 
Practice, 141 CHEST 232, 233 (2012). 
 46.  Charles P. Sabatino, National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale the 
Barriers, 1 NAELA J. 131, 132 (2005). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  OFF. DISABILITY, AGING & LONG-TERM CARE POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND ADVANCE CARE PLANNING: A REPORT TO 
CONGRESS 13 (2008). 
 49.  LO, supra note 35, at 91. 
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principal’s wishes), such as some of the examples discussed 
herein.50  There also may be uncertainty associated with 
interpreting vague language, as in the case of the patient who 
requests no “heroic” or “extraordinary” treatment.51  In addition, 
the disappointing fact remains that even when a patient has an 
advance directive, the patient often receives care inconsistent 
with his/her expressed preferences.52
C. MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Mental health or psychiatric advance directives (MHADs) 
represent a subset of advance directives geared specifically 
toward mental health or psychiatric care.  Whereas advance 
directives originally focused on end-of-life treatment decisions, 
MHADs serve “as a mechanism for enabling patients with 
severe mental illness to retain control over their psychiatric 
treatment in the event of a mental health crisis.”53  Examples of 
mental health treatment preferences include preferences with 
regard to medications, inpatient mental health treatment, and 
electroconvulsive therapy.54  Like other advance directives, 
MHADs may be in the form of a living will (i.e., to state 
particular treatment preferences), or in the form of a durable 
power of attorney for health care (i.e., to designate a proxy 
decision maker).  MHADs may represent a section of a general 
advance directive for health care or a unique document 
specifically designated for mental health treatment preferences.  
MHADs may also take the form of a “Ulysses directive,” which 
allows individuals “prospectively to bind themselves to 
treatment and override, in advance, their refusals during acute 
 50.  Wessels, supra note 16, at 225. 
 51.  LO, supra note 35, at 91. 
 52.  Lynch, supra note 30, at 137. 
 53.  NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS OF STATE LAWS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR VHA POLICY 3 (2008). 
 54.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 3. 
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episodes of their illnesses.”55  In theory, a properly executed 
Ulysses directive or “contract” would represent the patient’s 
informed consent for treatment that the patient may not revoke 
during a later period of incompetency.56
Proponents of MHADs highlight their advantages.  In 
general, MHADs promote patient autonomy by providing 
individuals with a vehicle to control and take responsibility for 
their treatment.57  MHADs may yield clinical benefits to patients 
such as the following: facilitating a patient’s timely access to 
treatment that works for him/her;58 “enhanc[ing] relationships 
between patients and mental health professionals and 
increas[ing] patients’ adherence to therapy, . . . decreas[ing] the 
need for involuntary treatment, and reduc[ing] hospitalization 
rates for psychiatric patients.”59  Empirical data suggests that 
MHADs also serve an important communicative function by 
serving as a record of “medically relevant information that 
would assist doctors” during an individual’s acute crisis, such as 
“medical conditions (e.g., diabetes) that could be masked by 
overt mental health symptoms (e.g., depression).”60
However, like all advance directives, mental health advance 
directives also have potential weaknesses.  These include patient 
comprehension of applicable laws, the ability to predict one’s 
feelings about future scenarios, and lack of access to MHADs.61
As of 2006, 27 states have legalized MHADs in some form.62
 55.  Breanne M. Sheetz, The Choice to Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric Advance 
Directives to Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support Self-Responsibility, 40 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 403 (2007). 
 56.  Roberto Cuca, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps Toward a Self-Binding 
Psychiatric Advance Directive Statute, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 1152, 1153 (1993). 
 57.  Eric B. Elbogen et al., Effectively Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives 
to Promote Self-Determination of Treatment Among People with Mental Illness, 13 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 273, 275 (2007). 
 58.  Id. at 274; Sheetz, supra note 55, at 404. 
 59.  NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 3. 
 60.  Elbogen, supra note 57, at 282. 
 61.  Id. at 275. 
 62.  Sheetz, supra note 55, at 408 (citing statutes from Alaska, Arizona, District 
of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
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Of the remaining states, some have acted in the other direction, 
i.e., to “specifically limit the degree to which advance directives 
can be used to make decisions about mental health care.”63
A February 2008 Report by the National Ethics Committee 
of VHA highlights some of the significant features of state law 
treatment of MHADs.64  First, some states require automatic 
expiration of MHADs, a requirement not seen for other advance 
directives, which typically expire upon revocation or upon a 
patient’s instructions.65  An individual wishing to maintain a 
MHAD in one of these states would have to complete another 
MHAD each time after passage of the defined time period.66
Second, to reduce possible coercion, many states restrict who 
may serve as a witness to MHADs, excluding individuals such 
as family members and treating providers.67  Third, some state 
laws set forth “override provisions” that “give clinicians greater 
leeway not to follow a MHAD than they do with a general 
advance directive.”68  For example, some states permit a 
provider not to follow a patient’s MHAD based on inpatient 
commitment, emergency, or if a provider determines a treatment 
is “essential.”69  Fourth, a couple of states require a positive 
capacity assessment by a mental health provider as a 
prerequisite for executing a MHAD, a requirement that no states 
impose for execution of other advance directives.70  Fifth, some 
states permit activation of a MHAD while a patient still has the 
capacity to make decisions.71  Finally, some states permit 
revocation of a MHAD after the patient has lost decision-making 
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming). 
 63.  NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 3 (citing 
North Dakota and Wisconsin). 
 64.  Id. at 3–4. 
 65.  Id. at 4. 
 66.  Id.
 67.  Id. at 5. 
 68.  Id. at 6. 
 69.  See id. at 7. 
 70.  Id.
 71.  Id. at 8. 
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capacity, which is also true in many states for other advance 
directives.72
Since some states have rejected their use and others have 
not addressed their legality, MHADs appear to be more 
controversial and relatively new legal tools, whose impact is still 
evolving. 
IV. HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING WITHIN THE VA 
A. APPLICABLE LAW
Based on authority rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, the VA, a federal agency, is subject to 
federal law.73  The Secretary of the VA, a presidential appointee, 
has broad authority and “is responsible for the proper execution 
and administration of all laws administered by the Department 
and for the control, direction, and management of the 
Department.”74  Within the VA, the “primary function” of the 
VHA is “to provide a complete medical and hospital service for 
the medical care and treatment of veterans” as set forth by 
statute and pursuant regulations.75
Pursuant to this authority, the VA has its own specific 
regulations and policies that pertain to health care decision 
making.  For purposes of this article, the central regulations are 
at 38 C.F.R. Section 17.32, which sets forth the VA’s general 
requirements for informed consent and advanced care 
planning.76  The VHA’s National Center for Ethics in Health 
Care has primary responsibility for “the development and 
interpretation of VHA national policies on ethics in health care,” 
including “policies on informed consent for treatments and 
 72.  Id. at 9. 
 73.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  See also Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54–60 
(1981); Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 57 (1920); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 
283 (1899). 
 74.  38 U.S.C. § 303 (2012). 
 75.  38 U.S.C. § 7301(b) (2012). 
 76.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2012).  
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procedures, ethical aspects of end-of-life care, advance care 
planning, state-authorized portable orders, disclosure of adverse 
events to patients, and financial relationships between VHA 
health care providers and industry.”77  National policies that 
pertain to this article include VHA Handbooks on Informed 
Consent for Clinical Treatments and Procedures78 and Advance 
Care Planning and Management of Advance Directives.79  Local 
policies reiterate the national policies and often provide more 
specific guidance on implementation, sometimes incorporating 
relevant state law provisions.  In addition, ethics consultation is 
available at both the local and national levels to provide 
guidance in situations involving VA requirements for informed 
consent and advance directives.  Moreover, the VA’s Office of 
General Counsel (including its local Offices of Regional Counsel) 
provides legal services to the VA, including advice on legal 
issues pertaining to health care decision making.80
B. INFORMED CONSENT
As discussed above, the legal doctrine of informed consent 
provides the foundation for one’s individual right to make 
health care decisions.  The general mandate for VA regulations, 
under the applicable federal statute, is “to ensure that all 
medical and prosthetic research carried out and, to the 
maximum extent practicable, all patient care furnished under 
this title shall be carried out only with the full and informed 
consent of the patient or subject or, in appropriate cases, a 
representative thereof.”81  The VA regulation governing 
informed consent and advance care planning provides the 
 77.  Nat’l Ctr. for Ethics in Health Care, VHA DIRECTIVE 1004 (Dep’t Veterans 
Aff., Washington, D.C.), July 29, 2008, at 2. 
 78.  Informed Consent for Clinical Treatments & Procs., VHA DIRECTIVE 1004.01
(Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), Aug. 14, 2008 [hereinafter VHA
HANDBOOK 1004.01]. 
 79.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at T-1. 
 80.  Id. at 7, 14. 
 81.  38 U.S.C. § 7331 (2012). 
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definitions, policy, general requirements for informed consent 
and advance care planning, requirements for documentation of 
informed consent, requirements for surrogate consent, and 
requirements for special consent situations.82  The national 
policies, VHA Handbooks 1004.01 and 1004.02, Informed 
Consent for Clinical Treatment and Procedures and Advance 
Care Planning and Advance Directives, respectively, mirror and 
specify the requirements set forth in 38 CFR Section 17.32.83
1. INFORMED CONSENT REQUIREMENTS IN THE VA
The VA provides expansive protections for patient rights in 
relation to informed consent, which the regulations define as 
“the freely given consent that follows a careful explanation by 
the practitioner to the patient or the patient’s surrogate of the 
proposed diagnostic or therapeutic procedure or course of 
treatment.”84  VA patients have “the right to accept or refuse any 
medical treatment or procedure recommended to them.”85
Although there are some exceptions (e.g., medical emergencies) 
within the VA, “all treatments and procedures require the prior, 
voluntary informed consent of the patient, or if the patient lacks 
decision-making capacity, the patient’s authorized surrogate.”86
Oral consent suffices for some treatments, while others, e.g., 
those requiring sedation or anesthesia, require written or 
“signature” consent.87  VA policy rejects the concept of “‘general’ 
or ‘blanket’ consent for medical treatment” and mandates that 
 82.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32 (2012). 
 83.  NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 2; VHA
HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at T-1, 6, 11, 12.  There are distinct informed 
consent requirements for research that are beyond the scope of this article and not 
discussed herein.  See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. pt. 16; Requirements for Protection Hum. Subjects 
Research, VHA HANDBOOK 1200.05 (Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), May 2, 
2012, at 56–65; Assurance Protection for Human Subjects Research, VHA HANDBOOK
1058.03 (Dep’t Veterans Aff., Washington, D.C.), May 10, 2007. 
 84.  32 C.F.R. § 17.32(c) (2012). 
 85.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 3. 
 86.  Id. (emphasis in original).  
 87.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(d) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, 
at 3.   
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the patient provide “separate consent for each treatment, 
procedure, therapeutic course of treatment for a particular 
problem or condition . . . or series of treatments (e.g., cycles of 
chemotherapy).”88  The VA also requires a new informed 
consent process “(1) [i]f there is a significant deviation from the 
treatment plan to which the patient originally consented; or (2) 
[i]f there is a change in the patient’s condition or diagnosis that 
would reasonably be expected to alter the original informed 
consent.”89  Heightened consent requirements apply in certain 
situations, including “unusual or extremely hazardous treatment 
or procedure,” and forced administration of psychotropic 
medication.90
VA regulations and policy provide specific requirements for 
the process of obtaining informed consent.91  The standard for 
informed consent disclosure is a reasonable patient standard and 
requires that the practitioner “[p]rovide information that a 
patient, in similar circumstances, would reasonably want to 
know.”92  The discussion must also include an explanation of the 
patient’s condition and the recommended treatment, expected 
risks and benefits, and reasonable alternatives.93
The informed consent process may only take place with a 
patient who has decision making capacity, which is presumed in 
the case of adults not adjudicated incompetent by a court of 
law.94  In contrast to “competency” (a “legal determination made 
by a court of law that a patient has the requisite capacities to 
make a medical decision”) clinical evaluation determines 
decisional capacity.95  VA policy defines decision-making 
capacity to include four faculties: understanding, appreciating, 
 88.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 4. 
 89.  Id.
 90.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(g) (2012). 
 91.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(c) (2012).  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 6–7. 
 92.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 6. 
 93.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(c) (2012).  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 7. 
 94.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 5–6. 
 95.  Id. at 1. 
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formulating, and communicating.96  Under VA requirements, the 
“practitioner who has primary responsibility for the patient” 
determines whether the patient has decision making capacity.97
2. IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERING STANDARDS OF CARE
The existence of the VA’s informed consent requirements 
creates the possibility that the standard of care for informed 
consent under state law will differ from – and even conflict with 
– VA requirements.  Although the VA and its providers have the 
legal authority to follow VA requirements pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause, as discussed in Section IV.A, the differences 
between state law and VA requirements for informed consent 
may have implications for the VA’s liability under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act and for licensure of VA providers. 
Wisconsin law provides an example of state law informed 
consent requirements that differ from VA requirements.  The 
Wisconsin statute requires a treating physician to “inform the 
patient about the availability of all alternate, viable medical 
modes of treatment and about the benefits and risks of these 
treatments.”98  However, this duty specifically excludes the 
following: 
(1) Information beyond what a reasonably well-
qualified physician in a similar medical classification 
would know. 
(2) Detailed technical information that in all probability 
a patient would not understand. 
(3) Risks apparent or known to the patient. 
(4) Extremely remote possibilities that might falsely or 
detrimentally alarm the patient. 
(5) Information in emergencies where failure to 
provide treatment would be more harmful to the 
patient than treatment. 
(6) Information in cases where the patient is incapable 
96.  Id. at 1–2. 
 97.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, 
at 8.    
 98.  WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012). 
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of consenting.99
Thus, many of the exceptions to the Wisconsin informed 
consent regulation differ from the VA informed consent 
requirements.  For example, the VA requires description of 
“extremely unlikely” risks that “may result in death or 
permanent disability,”100 while the Wisconsin provision permits 
omitting the information if it “might falsely or detrimentally 
alarm the patient.”101  The Wisconsin provision’s language of 
“detrimentally alarm” may even hint at a physician’s potential 
liability under Wisconsin law for disclosing such information.  
Another example arises when a patient lacks decisional capacity 
and has a surrogate who has provided consent for a treatment or 
procedure.  The VA requires the practitioner to “explain to the 
patient the treatment or procedure to which the surrogate has 
consented, if feasible,”102 while the Wisconsin provision appears 
to reject such a duty.103
To the extent a patient wished to pursue legal action for a 
VA employee’s negligence with regard to informed consent (or 
any other aspect of medical malpractice), under the Westfall Act, 
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) would be the exclusive 
remedy for such an action, and the proper defendant would be 
the United States (i.e., not the individual employee).104  The 
FTCA represents a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that 
allows suit against the United States for its negligent actions.  
Under the FTCA, other than pre-judgment interest and punitive 
damages, the United States is liable in the same manner and to 
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances 
for negligent acts or omissions of any employee of the 
government while acting in the scope of employment.105  The 
 99.  Id.
 100.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 7. 
 101.  WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012). 
 102.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 14. 
 103.  WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012). 
 104.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)(1), 2679(d) (2012). 
 105.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2672, 2674 (2012). 
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law of the state where the tort occurred applies to determine 
negligence in a case brought under the FTCA.106  In the case of a 
medical malpractice action based on the failure to meet the 
standard of care with regard to informed consent, state law 
would likely consist of common law and possibly codified 
provisions.   
However, if a conflict of laws issue arose between federal 
and state law in a medical malpractice action based on 
compliance with VA requirements in the informed consent 
process, it is likely that the VA’s waiver of sovereign immunity 
under the FTCA would not apply, and, therefore, the VA would 
not face potential liability under the FTCA.  This is due to the 
fact that the FTCA provides the following “discretionary 
function” exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity: 
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an 
employee of the Government, exercising due care, in 
the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not 
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of 
a federal agency or an employee of the Government . . 
. .107
As discussed above, the VA’s informed consent 
requirements are set forth in applicable statute, regulations, and 
corresponding policies, and, as such, it appears that the 
discretionary function exception would likely apply to an 
employee who acts pursuant to those requirements.  The net 
result would be that a potential tort claimant would not be able 
to sue the United States or its employees based on compliance 
with the VA informed consent requirements.  The author could 
locate no cases dismissing an individual’s claim under the FTCA 
based on compliance with VA informed consent requirements in 
the face of a conflict between federal and state informed consent 
requirements.  However, one court has indicated that the United 
 106.  28 U.S.C. 1346(b) (2012). 
 107.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).   
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States would only face liability under the FTCA for negligence 
with regard to informed consent if state law imposed liability; 
i.e., failure to meet the VA informed consent standard set forth 
in 38 C.F.R. Section 17.32(a) would not suffice to waive 
sovereign immunity.108
Regardless of the VA’s potential liability under the FTCA, 
however, there is also the corollary issue that VA providers must 
hold a valid state license in at least one state,109 and some 
informed consent requirements may represent an exercise of a 
state’s authority with regard to licensure of its professionals.  For 
example, the Wisconsin informed consent statute is set forth 
under the Medical Examining Board subchapter of the Medical 
Practices Act.110  The issue of how a state licensing body would 
resolve a potential conflict in this area is beyond the scope of this 
article and would likely depend on the specific state licensure 
requirement at issue and the clinical facts of a particular 
situation.  However, in the event a state licensing body would 
pursue action against a VA provider’s license based on 
compliance with VA informed consent requirements, the VA 
could argue that such compliance is protected by the Supremacy 
Clause and the VA requirements discussed in Section IV.A.
C. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
 VA policy with regard to advance care planning is based 
on the following premises:  
(1) All adult patients who have decision-making 
capacity have the right to accept or refuse proposed 
medical treatments or procedures, regardless of the 
expected consequences; and  
(2) For patients who have lost decision-making 
capacity, the health care preferences they stated in 
 108.  Welch v. U.S., 737 F. Supp. 2d 18, 30 n.14 (D. Me. 2010) (citing Sea Air 
Shuttle Corp. v. U.S., 112 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1997); Dimmick v. Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal., 2006 WL 279350 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
 109.  38 U.S.C. § 7402(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
 110.  WIS. STAT. § 448.30 (2012). 
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advance need to be honored to the extent permitted by 
clinical and professional standards, and the law.111
The VA is committed to honoring patient preferences via 
“patient-centered care” and “shared decision making, an 
ongoing collaborative process between practitioners and 
patients or their surrogates.”112
In addition to recognizing its own advance directive forms, 
the VA recognizes “an advance directive that is valid in one or 
more States under applicable State law,”113 which VA policy 
refers to as “State-Authorized Advance Directive[s],” 114 and the 
VA also recognizes U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) advance 
directives.115  However, VA policy provides that such 
recognition of non-VA advance directives does not apply to 
“portions of an Advance Directive . . . that are not consistent 
with VA policy.”116  The VA provides patients wide discretion in 
determining which state’s law to utilize when executing a State-
Authorized Advance Directive; “applicable State law” can mean 
the law of the state where the advance directive was signed, the 
State where the patient now resides, or the State where the 
patient is receiving treatment.117  VA policy explicitly prohibits 
the use of advance directives for decision making in the case of a 
patient who has decision making capacity.118
Acknowledging that VA advance directives may not bear 
legal weight outside of the VA, the VA permits patients to have 
a State-authorized advance directive, a VA advance directive, or 
both types of advance directives.119  In doing so, the VA offers its 
patients greater freedom of choice with regard to advance 
directives than patients at non-VA facilities, who only have the 
 111.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 1. 
 112.  Id.
 113.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(h) (2012). 
 114.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 3, 10. 
 115.  Id. at 3. 
 116.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(h)(4) (2012). 
 117.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(a)(iii) (2012). 
 118.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 2. 
 119.  Id. at 10. 
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option to use advance directives recognized by state law.  
(Although most states have reciprocity provisions recognizing 
advance directives that are valid under the law of another state, 
such provisions typically limit the recognition to portions that 
do not conflict with that state’s own law).120  There are various 
ways that this freedom impacts patient choice, as discussed 
herein. 
1. OVERVIEW OF VA ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
The VA advance directive form is VA Form 10-0137, VA 
Advance Directive: Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care 
and Living Will.121  The VA advance directive includes a durable 
power of attorney for health care, which, like state forms, allows 
an individual to designate a person to make decisions for that 
individual in the event he/she is no longer able to do so.122  The 
VA advance directive also contains a living will section that 
allows the individual to express specific treatment preferences, 
including those pertaining to life-sustaining treatments (e.g., 
cardiopulmonary respiration, mechanical ventilation, kidney 
dialysis, and artificial nutrition and hydration) and mental 
health preferences.123
The VA advance directive is perhaps most notable for what 
it lacks, namely some of the restrictions on patient choice that 
exist in State-authorized advance directives.  The VA advance 
directive is relatively open-ended in both the power of attorney 
for health care and living will sections and, as such, allows 
patients to make certain decisions that may not be permitted 
under a State-authorized advance directive. 
As indicated by the following, the VA advance directive’s 
durable power of attorney for health care provides extremely 
 120.  Olick, supra note 45, at 234.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 154.11(9), 155.70(10) 
(2010). 
 121.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
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broad discretion to the designated Health Care Agent: 
If you get too sick to make decisions for yourself, your 
Health Care Agent will have the authority to make all 
health care decisions for you.  This includes decisions to 
admit and discharge you from any hospital or other 
health care institution.  Your Health Care Agent can 
also decide to start or stop any type of health care 
treatment . . . .124
In contrast to the VA form, some State-authorized advance 
directives limit the authority of the health care agent to make 
certain types of health care decisions.  For example, the State of 
Wisconsin Power of Attorney for Health Care form contains 
numerous limitations including the following: 1) prohibiting a 
health care agent from consenting to various types of mental 
health treatment, including inpatient admission to an institution 
for mental diseases and electroconvulsive treatment; 2) 
prohibiting a health care agent from admitting the individual to 
a nursing home or community-based residential facility for a 
long-term stay unless the individual executing the form 
specifically grants the health care agent that authority; 3) 
prohibiting a health care agent from consenting to withholding 
or withdrawal of orally ingested nutrition or hydration unless 
provision of the nutrition or hydration is medically 
contraindicated and the individual specifically grants the health 
care agent that authority; and 4) prohibiting a health care agent 
from making health care decisions for an individual who is 
pregnant unless she specifically grants the health care agent that 
authority.125  Wisconsin law also imposes the same limitations on 
a health care agent designated under a power of attorney for 
health care form other than the state form,126 i.e., one drafted by 
an attorney, as permitted under Wis. Stat. Section 155.30(2).127
The VA advance directive’s living will is also broad in 
 124.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 125.  WIS. STAT. § 155.30(3) (2012); STATE OF WIS., F-00085, POWER OF ATTORNEY 
FOR HEALTH CARE (Rev. June 2011). 
 126.  WIS. STAT. § 155.20 (2012). 
 127.  WIS. STAT. § 155.30(2) (2012). 
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comparison to some state forms.  In addition to containing 
sections addressing preferences about life-sustaining treatments 
and mental health preferences, the VA advance directive’s living 
will contains an open-ended section for additional preferences.128
Examples include, “social, cultural, or faith-based preferences 
for care, or preferences about treatments such as feeding tubes, 
blood transfusions, or pain medications.”129
The State of Wisconsin Declaration to Physicians (Living 
Will), in contrast, only addresses the use of life-sustaining 
procedures and feeding tubes in the event of a terminal 
condition or persistent vegetative state, and the applicable 
statute limits the scope of the State of Wisconsin Living Will to 
those treatment preferences.130  Although the State of Wisconsin 
Power of Attorney for Health Care form provides a section for 
the individual to address other “desires, special provisions or 
limitations” not otherwise addressed in the document,131 the 
State of Wisconsin Living Will does not provide such a section.  
Accordingly, individuals who wish to express treatment 
preferences not listed in the State of Wisconsin Living Will form 
may only do so through a health care agent.  This limitation 
could restrict choice for isolated individuals who do not have a 
suitable, willing person to serve as a health care agent. 
2. MENTAL HEALTH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN THE VA
With regard to MHADs, the VA’s approach is notable for 
two reasons: 1) it provides patients the ability to execute a 
MHAD, a freedom that some states do not provide; and 2) it 
attempts to provide equal treatment for both MHADs and 
general advance directives, i.e., by rejecting some of the 
heightened restrictions and other special requirements imposed 
 128.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  WIS. STAT. § 154.03 (2012); STATE OF WIS., F-00060, DECLARATION TO 
PHYSICIANS (Rev. Aug. 2008) (Wisconsin Living Will).
 131.  WIS. STAT. § 155.30(3) (2012); STATE OF WIS., F-00085, POWER OF ATTORNEY 
FOR HEALTH CARE (Rev. June 2011). 
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by some state laws. 
The contrast between VA requirements and Wisconsin law 
with regard to MHADs illustrates the great potential 
significance of an individual’s decision to engage in advance 
care planning within the VA as opposed to under state law.  
Under Wisconsin law, individuals are very restricted in their 
ability to engage in advance care planning for mental health 
treatment preferences.  Wisconsin is one of the states that does 
not offer a mental health advance directive form.  Furthermore, 
Wisconsin law imposes restrictions on the use of general 
advance directives that, essentially, prevent their use for mental 
health treatment preferences. 
As discussed above, the VA gives a health care agent under 
a durable power of attorney for health care wide latitude to 
make treatment decisions.  In particular, VA patients have the 
ability to designate an agent to make mental health treatment 
decisions that Wisconsin law would not permit, such as consent 
to inpatient mental health treatment and electroconvulsive 
therapy.132
The VA also provides patients the opportunity to express 
specific mental health treatment preferences in directive form in 
an open-ended section of the VA advance directive living will.133
This section contains no limitations and offers the option to 
document any mental health treatment preferences, including 
but not limited to “medications that have worked for you in the 
past and that you would want again, or . . . mental health 
facilities or hospitals that you like and those that you don’t 
like.”134  In contrast, Wisconsin law does not provide the 
opportunity to express mental health treatment preferences in its 
living will, which is limited in scope to preferences pertaining to 
life-sustaining procedures and feeding tubes.135  Thus, VA 
 132.  WIS. STAT. § 155.20 (2012).  
 133.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  WIS. STAT. § 154.03 (2012). 
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patients who are Wisconsin residents have far greater latitude to 
control their mental health treatment decisions in the event they 
are no longer able to make those decisions for themselves. 
In addition to offering patients broad discretion to engage 
in advance care planning with regard to mental health treatment 
preferences, the VA’s policy on MHADs is generally one that 
avoids treating MHADs differently than general advance 
directives.  For example, the VA has declined the following, 
which, as discussed above, represent some state approaches to 
MHADs: 1) requiring automatic expiration of MHADs; 2) 
imposing special restrictions on who may serve as a witness to a 
MHAD as compared with a general advance directive; 3) 
permitting providers to override MHADs in special 
circumstances that would not enable a provider to override a 
general advance directive; 4) imposing a capacity assessment 
requirement for execution of an MHAD; 5) permitting activation 
of a MHAD while a patient has decision-making capacity; and 6) 
imposing special restrictions on the revocation of MHADs that 
do not apply to general advance directives.136  By rejecting such 
state law approaches, the VA affirms its policy as one that offers 
parity for mental health treatment as compared with general 
medical treatment and attempts to minimize the stigma that can 
accompany mental illness.137
3. REVOCATION OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
In addition to substantive differences in the content of 
advance directives, the VA may differ from state law on the 
issue of when a patient may revoke an advance directive.  The 
applicable VA regulation states that, “[a] patient who has 
decision-making capacity may revoke an advance directive . . . at 
any time by using any means expressing the intent to revoke.”138
Since there is no provision addressing the right of a non-
 136.  NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 3–4. 
 137.  Id. at 2. 
 138.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(h)(3) (2012). 
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decisional patient to revoke an advance directive, it appears that 
the VA requires a patient have decision-making capacity in 
order to revoke an advance directive; the National Ethics 
Committee of the Veterans Health Administration has affirmed 
this interpretation.139
In contrast, Wisconsin law, like a majority of states,140
permits an individual to revoke his/her power of attorney for 
health care and/or instructional advance directive (i.e., State of 
Wisconsin Living Will) “at any time.”141  A principal may revoke 
a power of attorney for health care via the following methods: 
(a) Canceling, defacing, obliterating, burning, tearing or 
otherwise destroying the power of attorney for health 
care instrument or directing another in the presence of 
the principal to so destroy the power of attorney for 
health care instrument. 
(b) Executing a statement, in writing, that is signed and 
dated by the principal, expressing the principal’s intent 
to revoke the power of attorney for health care. 
(c) Verbally expressing the principal’s intent to revoke 
the power of attorney for health care, in the presence of 
2 witnesses. 
(d) Executing a subsequent power of attorney for health 
care instrument.142
The methods for revoking a Wisconsin living will are nearly 
identical to those for revocation of a power of attorney for health 
care, with the exception that Wisconsin law does not require two 
witnesses for verbal revocation of a Wisconsin living will but 
does impose a requirement of notification of the attending 
physician of the subsequent declaration.143
The Wisconsin statutes do not define “principal” (one who 
executes a power of attorney for health care) to require that the 
individual has decision-making capacity, and the corresponding 
statute setting forth the requirements for executing a power of 
 139.  NAT’L ETHICS COMM. VETERANS HEALTH ADMIN., supra note 53, at 9. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  WIS. STAT. §§ 155.40(1), 154.05(1) (2012).   
 142.  WIS. STAT. § 155.40(1) (2012). 
 143.  WIS. STAT. § 154.05 (2012). 
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attorney for health care explicitly states that such individual 
must be “of sound mind,”144 which one could reasonably 
interpret to include some capacity to make health care decisions.  
Given that the legislature chose to include the “sound mind” 
requirement for execution of a power of attorney for health care 
and not for revocation of a power of attorney for health care, it 
appears that there is no “sound mind” requirement for 
revocation.  Rather, under a “plain meaning” interpretation of 
the statutory language addressing revocation, an individual may 
revoke a power of attorney for health care under Wisconsin law 
regardless of his/her decisional capacity (and regardless of 
whether his/her power of attorney is activated), provided that 
the individual is able to perform one of the acts of revocation 
listed in the statute;145 this interpretation is consistent with the 
position of the Wisconsin Guardianship Support Center of the 
Coalition of Wisconsin Aging Groups.146  Some of the methods 
listed in Sections (a) and (c) of Wisconsin Statute Section 
155.40(1) are acts that could be relatively easy for an individual 
with no, or questionable, decision-making capacity to perform.  
For example, one could readily foresee a situation in which an 
individual lacks the mental capacity to weigh the risks, benefits, 
and other complexities of a health care decision but is able to 
deface a power of attorney for health care or verbally express the 
intent to revoke the power of attorney for health care in the 
presence of two witnesses.  Due to the “sound mind” 
requirement for execution of a power of attorney for health 
care,147 however, an individual lacking decisional capacity 
would likely not have the legal authority to revoke an existing 
power of attorney for health care by executing a new one.148
 144.  WIS. STAT. § 155.05(1) (2012). 
 145.  WIS. STAT. § 155.40(1) (2012). 
 146.  COAL. OF WIS. AGING GRPS., REVOKING A POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR HEALTH 
CARE (2011), available at http://cwagwisconsin.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/03/Revoking-a-Power-of-Attorney-for-Health-Care.pdf. 
 147.  WIS. STAT. § 155.05(1) (2012). 
 148.  WIS. STAT. § 155.40(1) (2012). 
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The Wisconsin statutes do not define “declarant” as one 
who executes a Wisconsin living will.  However, similar analysis 
applies, in that the statute for execution of a Wisconsin living 
will includes a “sound mind requirement,”149 while the 
revocation statute does not.150  Accordingly, it does not appear 
that a declarant must have decisional capacity to revoke a 
Wisconsin living will. 
The fact that a nondecisional individual may revoke a 
power of attorney for health care under Wisconsin law and not 
under VA requirements can raise complex legal issues.  In the 
case of a VA inpatient who lacks decisional capacity, it appears 
that such patient would not have the legal authority under VA 
requirements to revoke either a VA advance directive or a state 
authorized advance directive.  As discussed above, in the event 
of a conflict between state law and VA requirements, VA 
requirements (which require decisionality for revocation) would 
control in terms of VA operations. 
However, the issue becomes murkier in some cases.  
Consider the hypothetical case of an individual who receives 
care at the VA on an outpatient basis, whose advance directive 
has been activated (i.e., the patient has been deemed 
nondecisional), who subsequently commits an act of revocation 
under state law while in the community (i.e., outside of the VA), 
and then returns to the VA for care in a nondecisional state.  
While the revocation may be legally sufficient outside of the VA, 
it may be difficult to discern whether VA requirements permit or 
require the VA to honor the revocation. 
As stated above, the VA imposes the condition that patients 
have decision-making capacity in order to revoke an advance 
directive.  According to the proposed facts of the hypothetical 
scenario, it is unclear whether the patient had the capacity to 
revoke the advance directive.  VA policy states that a patient is 
“presumed to have decision-making capacity unless an 
 149.  WIS. STAT. § 154.03(1) (2012). 
 150.  WIS. STAT. § 154.05(1) (2012). 
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appropriate clinical evaluation determines that the patient lacks 
decision-making capacity, the patient is a minor, or the patient 
has been ruled incompetent by a court of law.”151  Under VA 
requirements, the “practitioner who has primary responsibility 
for the patient” determines whether the patient has decision-
making capacity.152  Accordingly, in our example, it appears that 
the “practitioner who has primary responsibility for the patient” 
would determine whether he/she had the capacity to revoke the 
advance directive.  Perhaps the patient has a condition (e.g., 
permanent brain damage) that the VA practitioner knows would 
have prevented the patient from having capacity at all times 
since the VA’s activation of the advance directive.  Or, perhaps, 
the VA practitioner saw the patient in close proximity to the 
time of the revocation and determined that the patient lacked 
decision making capacity at that time.  In such cases, the VA’s 
capacity requirement for revocation would appear to dictate that 
the VA not honor the revocation.  This would create the result of 
the revocation having legal weight outside of the VA (i.e., at 
private facilities), but not in the VA system.  Alternatively, the 
provider may be unable to determine whether the patient had 
the capacity to revoke the advance directive because the 
provider did not see the patient around the time of the 
revocation and/or the patient’s condition is one that results in 
fluctuating capacity, alternating between periods of 
nondecisionality and periods of lucidity.  Under such facts, the 
VA requirements may call for the VA to honor the revocation 
based on the default presumption of capacity.  The legal analysis 
for these types of situations is highly fact-specific, warranting a 
case-by-case legal analysis.  Additionally, ethics consultation 
may also help to resolve these issues. 
 151.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 12. 
 152.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, 
at 3. 
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4. DUAL ADVANCE DIRECTIVE SITUATIONS
The fact that the VA permits a patient to have both a VA 
advance directive and a State-authorized advance directive also 
can create interesting legal scenarios.  VA policy provides that 
both valid advance directives apply.153  However, in the event of 
a conflict, “the most recent one (as determined by examination 
of the date applied by the patient at the time the document was 
signed) prevails.”154  While this approach for resolving 
conflicting advance directives may sound simple, complexities 
can (and do) arise.  When comparing the VA advance directive 
with certain State-authorized advance directives, such as the 
Wisconsin forms, potential conflict is readily apparent and due 
in large part to the required, restrictive language embedded in 
the state form.  For example, in the “Provision of Feeding Tube” 
Section, the Wisconsin Power of Attorney for Health Care form 
expressly states, “[m]y health care agent may not have orally 
ingested nutrition or hydration withheld or withdrawn from me 
unless provision of the nutrition or hydration is medically 
contraindicated,”155 while the VA advance directive contains no 
such restriction.156  Accordingly, a VA patient could execute a 
VA advance directive designating a health care agent under the 
durable power of attorney for health care section and indicate in 
the living will section that the patient refuses, under any 
circumstances, to receive nutrition and/or hydration via feeding 
tube.  In the event the VA patient also executed a Wisconsin 
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care form, the two forms 
would conflict and raise the challenge of discerning what the 
patient truly would have wanted. 
It is important to note that the VA provision to honor the 
“most recent” valid advance directive does not always resolve 
conflicts between advance directives.  Consider a VA social 
 153.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at 13. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  WIS. STAT. § 155.30(3) (2012). 
 156.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.02, supra note 42, at app. A. 
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worker who, as part of the discharge planning process, assists a 
VA patient in completing both a VA advance directive and a 
State-authorized advance directive.  The State-authorized 
advance directive offers the patient the advantage of its 
applicability outside of the VA, while the VA advance directive 
offers the patient broad latitude to express treatment 
preferences.  The VA advance directive form, like some state 
forms, such as Wisconsin’s, does not require or provide a field 
for the time when the individual executed the document.  Unless 
the individual executing the document happened to note the 
time of signature or the social worker is available and recalls the 
execution of the advance directives, it may not be possible to tell 
which document is “most recent” and, therefore, controls. 
D. SURROGATES
In addition to having a distinct advance directive form, the 
VA has its own framework for surrogate decision making.  The 
VA defines Surrogate Decision Maker (“Surrogate”) as an 
“individual, organization or other body authorized under this 
section to give informed consent on behalf of a patient who lacks 
decision-making capacity.”157  A surrogate “generally assumes 
the same rights and responsibilities as the patient in the 
informed consent process.”158  This delegation of authority is 
particularly broad in light of the VA’s acknowledgment of all 
patients’ “right to accept or refuse any medical treatment or 
procedure recommended to them.”159  Accordingly, a VA 
patient’s surrogate assumes the position of the patient with 
substantial freedom to make health care decisions.160
 157.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(a)(1) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 
78, at 3. 
 158.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012). 
 159.  VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, at 3. 
 160.  VA policy does provide, however, for certain checks on a surrogate’s 
power, such as when a “practitioner considers the surrogate to be clearly acting 
contrary to the patient’s values and wishes or the patient’s best interests. Id. at 14.  
In those cases, “the practitioner must notify the Chief of Staff, or designee, and 
consult with the local Integrated Ethics program officer or Regional Counsel before 
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VA regulations and policy set forth the following Priority of 
Surrogates, who may provide informed consent on a patient’s 
behalf: 
(1) Health care agent; 
(2) Legal guardian or special guardian; 
(3) Next-of-kin: a close relative of the patient eighteen 
years of age or older, in the following priority: spouse, 
child, parent, sibling, grandparent, or grandchild; or 
(4) Close friend.161
This hierarchy has multi-faceted legal significance.  First, 
VA hierarchy contrasts with states that do not provide a list of 
surrogates, such as spouse and next of kin, who may make 
decisions for a patient in the event he/she did not designate a 
health care agent under a durable power of attorney for health 
care.  Wisconsin is one such state.  Under Wisconsin law, if a 
patient did not execute a durable power of attorney for health 
care, the patient’s spouse would not have legal authority to 
make health care decisions for the patient absent judicial 
intervention (i.e., appointment as guardian of the patient’s 
person).162  In contrast, if the patient received care at a VA 
facility, the spouse would be the default decision-maker, with 
full legal authority to make treatment decisions for the patient, 
absent a health care agent or legal guardian. 
Second, when compared with state law, the VA hierarchy 
may grant authority to individuals in a different order of 
priority than a particular state does.  For example, Illinois law 
does not include “grandparent” in its hierarchy for surrogate 
decision making.163  Thus, assuming no higher-level surrogates 
were available, a grandparent would have legal authority to 
make health care decisions for a VA patient but not for the same 
implementing the surrogate’s decision.”  Id. 
 161.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(e) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, 
at 13. 
 162.  See, e.g., COAL. OF WIS. AGING GRPS., AN OVERVIEW OF ADVANCE 
DIRECTIVES (2011), available at http://cwagwisconsin.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2011/06/An-Overview-of-Advance-Directives.pdf. 
 163.  755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/25 (2012). 
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individual in the event he/she received treatment at a non-VA 
facility in Illinois. 
In addition, by including “close friend” in the list or 
surrogates, the VA provides individuals who are not related to 
the patient by blood or marriage the potential opportunity to 
make health care decisions for the patient.  VA defines “close 
friend” as “[a]ny person eighteen years or older who has shown 
care and concern for the patient’s welfare; who is familiar with 
the patient’s activities, health, religious beliefs and values . . . 
.“164  This provision may be of particular importance to 
significant others in the case of unmarried couples, who may not 
have any legal rights to make health care decisions in the 
absence of a durable power of attorney for health care under 
state law. 
In the event no surrogate is available, the VA has its own 
unique process for making health care decisions for an 
incapacitated individual.165  In such cases a VA facility may 
either obtain a guardian or adhere to the following process: 
For treatments or procedures that involve minimal risk, 
the practitioner must verify that no authorized 
surrogate can be located.  The practitioner must 
attempt to explain the nature and purpose of the 
proposed treatment to the patient and enter this 
information in the health record.  For procedures that 
require signature consent, the practitioner must certify 
that the patient has no surrogate.  The attending 
physician and the Chief of Service (or his or her 
designee) must indicate their approval of the treatment 
decision in writing. Any decision to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment for such patients 
must be reviewed by a multi-disciplinary committee 
appointed by the facility Director.  The committee 
functions as the patient’s advocate and may not include 
members of the treatment team.  The committee must 
submit its findings and recommendations in a written 
 164.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(a) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, 
at 1. 
 165.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f) (2012).  See also VHA HANDBOOK 1004.01, supra note 78, 
at 14. 
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report to the Chief of Staff who must note his or her 
approval of the report in writing.  After reviewing the 
record, the facility Director may concur with the 
decision to withhold or withdraw life support or 
request further review by Regional Counsel.166
This process is significant because it provides a mechanism 
for decision making in non-emergency situations for patients 
who lack a surrogate without requiring judicial intervention.  
One legal commentator has described the benefits of this process 
as “conspicuously quicker, cheaper, and more efficient than the 
state guardianship process.”167  Given the VA’s high population 
of homeless veterans and other veterans who may lack 
appropriate or available surrogates, this process provides a 
useful means to making decisions for incapacitated veterans in a 
manner that maintains respect and protections for such veterans. 
V. CONCLUSION
There are significant differences between VA and state law 
requirements pertaining to health care decision making.  The 
examples highlighting Wisconsin law discussed herein represent 
just a small subsection of these differences, which will depend 
on the state law at issue.  An individual’s decision to make 
health care decisions and engage in advance care planning 
within the VA or under state law can have significant impact on 
the choices available to that individual, the processes for 
decision making, and, thus, the clinical outcomes.  Individuals 
eligible to receive care from the VA and health care providers 
who advise them should be aware of this impact and consider 
the differences between VA and state law when making health 
care decisions and participating in advance care planning. 
In addition, while the use of VA forms may provide 
patients with increased freedom with regard to the expression of 
 166.  38 C.F.R. § 17.32(f) (2012). 
 167.  Casey Frank, Surrogate Decision-Making for “Friendless” Patients, 34 COLO.
LAW. 71, 75 (2005). 
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certain health care preferences (e.g., mental health treatment 
preferences), the VA forms may not have legal recognition 
outside of the VA system, thus creating the potential need for a 
patient to also have a state-authorized advance directive.  Dual 
directives, in turn, can raise potential conflicts both legally and 
in terms of patient preferences. 
Individuals who provide care at the VA should be aware of 
the unique requirements governing practice within the Agency.  
The VA’s authority pursuant to the Supremacy Clause gives the 
Agency wide latitude to follow these requirements.  In the event 
of a potential conflict between VA requirements and state law, 
the VA has various resources to navigate such conflicts, 
including ethics consultation, the National Center for Ethics in 
Health Care, and the Office of General Counsel.  However, 
additional legal discourse may be warranted to examine the 
potential conflicts associated with VA requirements and state 
law requirements (e.g., those pertaining to licensure), and future 
case law may illustrate the significance of these conflicts. 
